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BANKRUPTCY
What Is a Misrepresentation “With Respect to” a Debtor’s “Financial Condition”
that Must Be in Writing to Render a Claim Nondischargeable?
CASE AT A GLANCE
A basic purpose of bankruptcy law is to provide a fresh start to the “honest but unfortunate” debtor. The
bankruptcy discharge is therefore not generally available for debts incurred by “false pretenses, a false
representation, or actual fraud.” However, if the false statement alleged by the creditor is one “respecting
the debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition,” it is only nondischargeable if the creditor can show that
it was in writing and that the creditor reasonably relied on it. The question in this case is whether a
statement by the debtor regarding a single asset, rather than its overall net worth or solvency, is a statement
respecting the debtor’s financial condition and, thus, subject to this higher standard for nondischargeability.

Lamar, Archer, & Cofrin v. Appling
Docket No. 16-1215
Argument Date: April 17, 2018
From: The Eleventh Circuit
by Marshall Tracht
New York Law School, New York, NY

INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy law permits an individual to discharge many but not
all debts so that a person can recover from misfortune. However,
debtors can be denied discharge altogether on account of some
types of misconduct, such as hiding assets from the bankruptcy
court or carrying speciic debts based on various public policies.
For example, child support payments, many tax debts, and debts
arising from malicious torts are not dischargeable. This case
concerns an exception from discharge for debts arising from “false
pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud.” Regardless of
whether the false statements are oral or written, such debts are
generally not dischargeable provided the creditor justiiably relied
on them. Some unscrupulous creditors developed the practice
of having debtors provide credit information on forms making
it dificult to be complete and accurate, speciically to make the
debts nondischargeable on the claim that they were secured by
misrepresentations. Congress therefore tightened the standard for
nondischargeability where the creditor is claiming a misstatement
with respect to the debtor’s inancial condition, requiring not only
that the statement be in writing, but that the creditor prove that
it reasonably relied on that information. This case addresses the
scope of representations covered by this higher standard: whether a
statement by the debtor about a particular asset is a statement “with
respect to” the debtor’s “inancial condition.”

requirements on the creditor seeking to have the claim held
nondischargeable?

FACTS
In 2004, R. Scott Appling (respondent) retained Lamar, Archer &
Cofrin, LLP (Lamar or petitioner) to represent him in commercial
litigation. By 2005, he had paid $135,000 in fees and owed another
$60,000. Although the testimony is in conlict, the bankruptcy court
apparently concluded that, during a meeting in March 2005 to
discuss the growing balance, Appling told Lamar that his accountant
said he would be able to ile amended tax returns and recover a
refund of more than $100,000. Lamar knew that Appling had no
other unencumbered assets, but continued to work on the case
based on this representation. In a meeting that November, according
to Lamar, Appling said that the accountant had made an error on
the return and Appling had not yet received the refund. In fact,
he had received the refund, of $59,000, the month before. In early
2006, the litigation settled, and soon thereafter Lamar learned that
Appling had already received the tax refund and it was not available
to pay the irm’s fees. In 2012, Lamar sued Appling for the unpaid
fees, obtaining a judgment for over $104,000. Appling and his wife
then iled for bankruptcy, and Lamar asserted that its claim was
not dischargeable because the debt was a result of Appling’s “false
pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud.”

ISSUE

CASE ANALYSIS

Does a false statement about a single asset fall within the
general standard for nondischargeability of debts arising from
false representations or fraud, or is it instead covered by the
speciic provision for false statements “respecting the debtor’s
or an insider’s inancial condition,” which imposes additional

Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that an
individual cannot discharge a debt “for money, property, services,
or an extension, renewal, or reinancing of credit, to the extent
obtained by…false pretenses, a false representation, or actual
fraud, other than a statement respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s
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inancial condition.” If the false statement regards “the debtor’s
or an insider’s inancial condition,” then Section 523(a)(2)(B)
provides that the debt can be discharged, but only if the creditor can
show that the statement was in writing, materially false, and made
with intent to deceive, and that the creditor reasonably relied on the
statement.
The Bankruptcy Court held that Appling’s comments about the
tax refund were not statements respecting his inancial condition
because they did not address his “overall inancial condition or net
worth” and were therefore not subject to the higher standards of
Section 523(a)(2)(B). In other words, these statements justiied
denying the discharge of his debt to Lamar even though the
statements were not in writing. The district court agreed, but the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a statement
about a single asset can be a statement respecting the debtor’s
inancial condition and thus Section 523(a)(2)(B) applied. The
court explained that the statute was “unambiguous” and that while
“inancial condition” likely refers to net worth, a statement about an
asset is one “respecting” inancial condition because it is related to
or affects the debtor’s net worth. A contrary reading, the court held,
would give no meaning to the word “respecting.”
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision was consistent with Engler v. Van
Steinburg, 744 F.2d 1060 (4th Cir. 1984), in which the court held
that a debtor’s statement that he owned a property free and clear of
liens was a statement respecting his inancial condition. However,
these decisions are in conlict with In re Joelson, 427 F.3d 700
(10th Cir. 2005) (holding that statements about speciic assets that
could serve as collateral for a loan were not statements respecting
the debtor’s inancial condition because they did not purport to
address her “overall inancial health”) and In re Bandi, 683 F.3d
671 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1086 (2013) (holding that
representations that the debtor owned certain real estate were not
statements respecting the debtor’s inancial condition).
Both parties agree that “inancial condition,” as used in the statute,
refers to the aggregate of the debtor’s assets and liabilities, or the
debtor’s overall inancial health or net worth. The disagreement
arises over the meaning of “respecting…inancial condition.”
Appling argues that “respecting” is consistently used in law as
a broadening term, like “related to.” Thus, he argues, the First
Amendment prohibition on any law “respecting the establishment
of religion” extends beyond statutes that would actually establish a
national religion. In interpreting the Civil Rights Act, Appling notes,
the Court has said that “with respect to voting” means having a
“direct relation to, or impact on, voting.”
Lamar argues that “respecting” is an ambiguous term that can
mean “about” or “concerning” or “regarding” and, in light of the
history of the Bankruptcy Code, should not be read expansively.
Congress intended to limit Section 523(a)(2)(B) to statements
about the debtor’s overall inancial health. Statements “respecting”
inancial condition are more than “statements of inancial
condition,” which might have been read to be limited to formal
inancial statements or balance sheets, but should not be read to
sweep in every statement about an asset or a debt. The Section
covers a statement like “Don’t worry, I am above water,” as it is
about the debtor’s overall inancial condition, Lamar argues. But
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Lamar asserts reading Section 523(a)(2)(B) to cover any statement
that can have an effect on net worth ignores Congressional intent in
limiting the provision to statements about “inancial condition.”
Appling disagrees, noting that while statements about assets or
liabilities are statements respecting the debtor’s inancial condition,
there are still a wide range of misrepresentations that fall outside
the limits of Section 523(a)(2)(B). Reported cases include
misrepresentations by debtors of their professional qualiications,
skills, or experience; the intended use of borrowed funds; and the
costs of materials, for example. Thus, the limitation to statements
respecting “inancial condition” has meaning even if it covers all
statements about individual assets.
Moreover, Appling argues, the statute must be read in light of preCode law. Under a 1903 statute, the Bankruptcy Act denied discharge
to a person who made materially false statements in writing to the
creditor. Courts held, however, that false representations to credit
rating agencies, like Dun’s, were not “made to” the creditor and
thus did not block the debtor’s discharge. In 1926, Congress closed
this loophole, barring discharge where a person obtained credit
“by making or publishing, or causing to be made or published in
any manner whatsoever, a materially false statement in writing
respecting his inancial condition.” In interpreting this statute,
courts held that statements regarding speciic assets were covered
by the language “respecting his inancial condition.” Appling argues
that Congress was aware of this interpretation when it adopted the
nondischargeability provisions in Section 523.
Lamar’s rebuttal is based on the premise that bankruptcy is intended
to provide a discharge to the honest but unfortunate debtor, not to
those who commit fraud, and the broad reading given to “respecting
his inancial condition” under the pre-Code statute worked against
those who had committed fraud. Under the current statute, a broad
reading makes it easier for a person who committed fraud to get a
discharge. Thus, he argues, it cannot be assumed that Congress
intended the pre-Code cases to govern.

SIGNIFICANCE
The case presents a direct circuit split on an issue that regularly
arises. The National Federation of Independent Business iled an
amicus brief arguing that the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling would create
a tremendous burden on small businesses that often extend credit
based on oral representations and would, under its ruling, often
be unable to raise these oral misrepresentations as a basis for
nondischargeability. While there might be some truth to this, the
number of cases involved is likely modest, particularly given the
costs of contesting dischargeability and the fact that the discharge
provisions apply only to debts owed by individuals, not those owed by
business entities like corporations or LLCs.

Marshall Tracht is a professor of law at New York Law School. He
can be reached at 212.431.2139 or mtracht@nyls.edu.
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